Executive summary

The events reported between 15 and 23 July 2026 do not describe separate crises. They reveal a single regional system under cumulative stress: military escalation between the United States and Iran; threatened attacks on deeply buried nuclear-linked infrastructure; Iranian strikes across neighbouring Arab States; civilian grief and unresolved accountability after the Minab school strike; an opaque United States-Saudi civil-nuclear agreement; destabilising conduct at Al-Aqsa Mosque/Temple Mount; and sanctions that civil-society organisations say obstruct cooperation with the International Criminal Court.

At the same time, a legally disciplined analysis cannot treat every allegation as proven. Iranian military claims about damage to United States assets, Iranian allegations that attacks were launched from Kuwaiti territory, the function of Pickaxe Mountain, casualty totals at Minab, and the practical terms of the Saudi nuclear agreement require different levels of confidence. The most serious claims demand independent evidence, not repetition. Where attribution or proportionality remains unresolved, the duty is to investigate promptly, preserve evidence and disclose findings, not to convert uncertainty into impunity.

Key findings

Chronology and factual context

The analytical period begins before the July escalation because the present crisis rests on earlier decisions. The chronology below distinguishes documented official acts from claims that remain contested.

Scope, methodology and evidentiary limits

This analysis compares ten supplied news reports from Reuters/Dawn, Tehran Times, The Times of Israel, CNN and Al Jazeera with primary or institutional materials from the United Nations, the International Court of Justice, the International Atomic Energy Agency, the International Committee of the Red Cross, the United States Government and the plaintiffs' filed complaint. The sources were assessed by proximity, independence, access to primary material, internal specificity and corroboration.

Three limitations are decisive. First, the full United States-Saudi nuclear agreement and its bilateral safeguards instrument were not available in the reviewed public record. Second, there is no completed, publicly accessible independent investigation resolving the Minab target-selection process and final casualty count. Third, many reported July military outcomes come from belligerent authorities. Accordingly, this article reaches firm conclusions on legal standards and institutional safeguards, but qualified conclusions on disputed operational facts.

Actors, interests and responsibilities

United States

The United States combines overwhelming military capacity, alliance commitments, sanctions power, nuclear-export authority and a permanent seat on the Security Council. Its declared objectives include limiting Iranian military and nuclear capacity, protecting navigation and allies, and advancing non-proliferation. Yet the coherence of that position depends on lawful force, civilian-harm transparency, consistent nuclear standards and respect for independent accountability. A policy that threatens deeper attack while withholding sufficient public accounting for a mass-casualty school strike weakens its claim to rules-based leadership.

Iran

Iran invokes sovereignty, self-defence and resistance to United States coercion. It also retains duties under the Charter and international humanitarian law. Even if a prior armed attack establishes a right of self-defence, every responsive operation remains constrained by necessity, proportionality and civilian protection. Iranian military reporting about attacks in Bahrain, Jordan and Kuwait therefore cannot be evaluated solely through the language of retaliation. The location, function and expected civilian effects of each target matter. So does the legal position of the territorial State.

Israel and Palestinian stakeholders

Israel has legitimate duties to protect its population from attack. As occupying Power in East Jerusalem, however, it also bears obligations toward the protected population and must respect religious access without discriminatory or arbitrary interference. Israeli authorities control policing at Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount while Jordan retains a recognised custodial role over Muslim holy sites. Palestinian worshippers, the Islamic Waqf, Christian communities and Jewish worshippers all possess genuine religious and human interests; government conduct should reduce rather than instrumentalise their vulnerability.

Saudi Arabia and Gulf States

Saudi Arabia has a legitimate interest in diversified electricity generation and secure access to civilian nuclear technology. Kuwait, Bahrain, Jordan and other States also have sovereign rights and security interests that are imperilled when their territory or infrastructure becomes part of a wider confrontation. Hosting foreign forces does not erase territorial sovereignty or civilian-protection duties. Nor does an alliance automatically make every dual-use installation a lawful military objective.

IAEA, United Nations, courts and civil society

The IAEA's comparative advantage is verification, not geopolitical punishment. The Security Council has primary responsibility for international peace and security, but veto politics and selective enforcement can obstruct legitimacy. Domestic courts can review executive sanctions and war-related authority. The ICC, human rights organisations, journalists and researchers contribute evidence and legal scrutiny. Their independence does not place them beyond criticism, but criticism should take the form of lawful challenge and reasoned review, not measures that indiscriminately disable protected advocacy.

Local, regional and global peace

Deterrence is producing a spiral, not a settlement

The immediate logic on each side is recognisable. The United States seeks to impose costs sufficient to change Iranian behaviour; Iran seeks to demonstrate that attacks cannot be contained within its borders and that regional hosts of United States assets will share the cost. Israel maintains readiness to join further action. Gulf States seek protection while avoiding direct entry into the war. Each actor may describe its conduct as deterrent. Collectively, however, the pattern resembles a security dilemma: one actor's defensive preparation is read by another as evidence of offensive intent.

The reported threat of an attack "bigger than ever before" is especially dangerous because strategic ambiguity can deter only while communication, command and red lines remain intelligible. In a multi-front environment involving missiles, drones, maritime commerce, nuclear-linked sites, cloud infrastructure and foreign bases, ambiguity also increases the chance that an incident will be misread. The International Court of Justice has explained that whether a threat of force is lawful depends on whether the contemplated use would itself be lawful.¹¹ Public rhetoric is therefore not legally irrelevant theatre.

Minab demonstrates why peace without truth is unstable

The Minab families' reburial of newly identified remains is not merely a humanitarian after-story. It is evidence that the effects of attack persist through grief, uncertainty, fragmented remains and distrust. Reported casualty figures vary, and inflammatory state-media language should not substitute for findings. Yet uncertainty about the exact number cannot negate the established gravity of a strike on a functioning school during school hours.

A credible peace process requires a mechanism capable of answering what was targeted, what intelligence was relied upon, what warnings existed, what precautions were taken, why the school was struck, who authorised the attack and what reparation is owed. The United Nations human rights office has called for accountability and emphasised the families' right to know the truth.¹² Refusing or delaying such an accounting converts individual grief into structural grievance and provides propaganda to every party seeking renewed war.

Sacred space can become an ignition point

The contrast between prayers for peace at the Western Wall and reported assertions of ownership inside the adjacent compound captures the region's central political failure. Religious attachment is real and should not be mocked or erased. But when a state minister enters a site under heavy police protection, public prayer expands despite the longstanding arrangement, and Muslim access is reportedly restricted, the event is no longer only private devotion. It acquires the character of public power.

Peace requires equal respect for religious freedom and restraint by officials whose acts can reasonably be understood as changing the site's administration or use. The Security Council has repeatedly heard calls to preserve the historical and legal status quo of Jerusalem's holy sites.¹³ Because Al-Aqsa carries transnational religious significance, an avoidable incident can trigger mobilisation far beyond Israel and Palestine, including in States already exposed to the Iran conflict.

Local, regional and international security

Pickaxe Mountain: uncertainty is not target confirmation

Reuters reporting reproduced by Dawn places Pickaxe Mountain near the Natanz complex and describes a deeply buried tunnel facility under construction. A private technical institute's satellite analysis identifies hardened entrances and continuing construction, while an Iranian spokesperson denies current nuclear activity. The same reporting says the facility may be beyond the effective reach of existing bunker-buster munitions.¹⁴

These facts support surveillance and urgent verification, but not an automatic conclusion that the facility is presently a nuclear-weapons site or lawful military objective. Civilian objects become military objectives only when, by nature, location, purpose or use, they effectively contribute to military action and their destruction offers a definite military advantage in the circumstances at the time. Doubt matters. So do the expected effects of penetrating munitions, tunnel collapse, nearby infrastructure and any radiological material.

There is also a strategic paradox. Repeated attacks on declared or suspected nuclear facilities incentivise deeper burial, dispersal, concealment and reduced cooperation. Those adaptations then appear to confirm worst-case assumptions and invite further attack. Verification becomes harder precisely because coercion is substituted for inspection. The IAEA has repeatedly warned that attacks jeopardising nuclear safety can have grave consequences and that nuclear facilities should not be attacked.¹⁵

The United States-Saudi deal: civilian right, regional responsibility

The NPT protects the right of parties to develop nuclear energy for peaceful purposes without discrimination, in conformity with the Treaty's non-proliferation obligations.¹⁶ Saudi Arabia's civil-nuclear ambition is therefore not inherently unlawful or illegitimate. The security question is whether the proposed architecture minimises proliferation, diversion, accident and attack risks.

The Department of Energy confirms that the agreement will be transmitted to Congress and states that it upholds high non-proliferation standards. Public reporting nevertheless describes uncertainty over domestic enrichment, a possible contractor-operated "black box" arrangement, spent-fuel control and the relationship between the agreement and Saudi normalisation with Israel.¹⁷ A presidential social-media statement that there will be no enrichment is politically relevant, but it is not a substitute for binding text, verification rights, termination provisions and an enforceable response to breach.

As of 30 June 2026, IAEA status records showed Saudi Arabia's comprehensive safeguards agreement in force and an Additional Protocol signed but not in force.¹⁸ Before sensitive transfer, the strongest confidence-building package would include an Additional Protocol in force; permanent restrictions on indigenous enrichment and reprocessing unless later agreed under stringent multilateral conditions; assured access for IAEA inspectors; transparent spent-fuel arrangements; nuclear-safety peer review; and emergency cooperation with neighbouring States.

Regional bases and dual-use infrastructure

Iranian reporting claims attacks on airbases, logistics facilities and cloud infrastructure allegedly supporting United States military operations. International humanitarian law does not immunise an installation merely because it is privately owned, nor does military use remove every protection from an entire civilian system. For dual-use digital infrastructure, the analysis must identify the specific contribution to military action, the definite advantage anticipated, foreseeable cascading harm to civilian communications or services, and feasible precautions.

Iran's accusation that United States strikes were launched from Kuwaiti territory also requires evidence. If substantiated, it would raise serious questions about Kuwait's role, the law governing the use of its territory and Iran's response. It still would not authorise indiscriminate retaliation against Kuwait or its population. State responsibility for aid or assistance requires knowledge of the circumstances and a legally relevant contribution; it is not established by geography or political association alone.¹⁹

Universal human rights and civilian protection

Life, education and dignity after death

The right to life continues to inform state conduct during conflict alongside the more specific rules of international humanitarian law. The principles of distinction, proportionality and precaution require parties to distinguish civilians and civilian objects from military objectives, refrain from attacks expected to cause excessive incidental civilian harm, verify targets and cancel or suspend an attack when the legal conditions are not met.²⁰

A school is presumptively civilian. Its location near a former or active military site does not remove protection. If a party alleges military use, it must support that characterisation with evidence and still apply proportionality and precautions. The reported double impact at Minab, the presence of children and the scale of destruction make a prompt investigation legally and morally indispensable. The investigation should be independent of the operational chain of command, capable of securing targeting records and weapon data, and empowered to recommend prosecution, disciplinary action, reparations and operational reform.

The identification and reburial of remains also engages dignity, family life, cultural and religious practice, and the right to truth. Families should receive accurate information, meaningful participation and psychosocial support. Competing casualty numbers should be reconciled through transparent forensic methodology, not political messaging.

Freedom of religion without domination

Article 18 of the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights protects freedom of thought, conscience and religion; manifestation may be limited only by law and where necessary to protect public safety, order, health, morals or the fundamental rights and freedoms of others.²¹ This framework protects Jewish and Muslim attachment to the site. It does not support selective access, coercive worship, discriminatory policing or state rhetoric that denies another community's equal dignity.

The practical question is not whether one tradition must be erased to recognise another. It is whether authorities apply transparent, non-discriminatory rules that protect worship and prevent officials or organised groups from turning access into a demonstration of sovereign domination. In occupied East Jerusalem, that assessment must also account for the law of occupation and the prohibition on unilateral measures that entrench unlawful territorial acquisition.

Expression, association and human rights defence

The ICC sanctions dispute connects foreign policy to domestic civil liberties. Executive Order 14203 prohibits certain contributions of funds, goods or services to designated persons or activities and authorises property and entry restrictions. The July 2026 complaint alleges that the regime caused DAWN and TAAG to stop evidence-sharing, legal analysis and advocacy connected to ICC investigations and sanctioned Palestinian organisations.²²

Those are allegations, not final findings. The United States also advances a serious sovereignty objection: it is not party to the Rome Statute and contests ICC jurisdiction over its nationals and those of Israel. But the legal answer cannot be assumed from the policy disagreement. The court must assess statutory authority, notice, vagueness, viewpoint discrimination, overbreadth and the extent to which protected speech or association can be burdened under emergency economic powers. A democratic state confident in its legal position should be able to defend that position before an independent court.

Democratic values, accountability and the rule of law

War powers require more than executive assertion

The scale and duration of the conflict make legislative scrutiny a constitutional necessity, not a procedural nuisance. Decisions about an expanded attack, regional basing, funding, target categories and the conditions for ending hostilities should be subject to public legal justification and effective legislative review. Secret intelligence may protect sources and operations, but it cannot displace the duty to identify the domestic and international legal basis for sustained war.

Accountability also requires after-action review. If United States forces struck Minab, classification should be narrowed to what is genuinely necessary, while factual findings, methodology, civilian-harm estimates and remedial commitments should be made public. If the evidence supports a different attribution, it should be disclosed with sufficient detail to permit independent testing. The rule of law is not served by permanent uncertainty controlled by the party with the evidence.

Non-proliferation cannot depend on political alignment

Iran and Saudi Arabia are not identically situated, and different safeguards histories can justify different conditions. But differences must be explained through objective criteria: declared material, inspection access, Additional Protocol status, enrichment capability, record of compliance and regional risk. If allied States receive sensitive pathways while adversaries are denied even verifiable peaceful options, the NPT bargain appears political rather than legal. That perception encourages hedging and weakens cooperation with the IAEA.

Conditioning a nuclear agreement on joining the Abraham Accords would also combine three distinct questions: civil-nuclear safety, bilateral recognition of Israel and Palestinian rights. Diplomatic normalisation can contribute to peace, but tying it to sensitive nuclear cooperation risks making non-proliferation standards negotiable and further marginalising Palestinians from decisions that affect the regional order.

Institutional independence is a security safeguard

Courts, inspectors, journalists and civil-society organisations can err and must be accountable for method, mandate and law. Their function, however, is to introduce evidence and review into environments dominated by state power. Broad sanctions or political threats aimed at their ordinary work can produce a chilling effect even before enforcement. That weakens early warning, documentation and legal remedy. In the long term, suppressing scrutiny does not remove allegations; it removes peaceful channels for testing them.

Security without review becomes discretion; discretion without equal law becomes impunity; and impunity is not stability but deferred conflict.

Integrated legal, democratic and security assessment

The strongest connection across the evidence is not a single alliance or ideology. It is the progressive replacement of verifiable restraint by unilateral power. Military threat is asked to substitute for diplomacy. Air attack is asked to substitute for nuclear inspection. executive sanctions are asked to substitute for legal rebuttal. Police control is asked to substitute for an agreed framework at a sacred site. Official narrative is asked to substitute for independent investigation.

Each substitution may produce an immediate tactical gain. A strike can delay construction; a sanction can interrupt cooperation; a heavily protected visit can demonstrate control; a classified review can protect officials from short-term embarrassment. Yet the cumulative strategic cost is high:

• Iran hardens and disperses capabilities, making verification more difficult.
• Gulf States become targets because foreign military infrastructure is embedded in their territory.
• Saudi nuclear ambiguity fuels regional hedging and Iranian claims of double standards.
• Palestinian exclusion at a sacred site intensifies mobilisation across Muslim-majority societies.
• Civilian deaths without credible investigation erode the legitimacy of every later demand for legal compliance.
• Pressure on the ICC and its interlocutors narrows non-violent pathways for accountability.

The rule of law connects all four analytical domains. Charter compliance reduces interstate escalation. Humanitarian law protects civilians and limits retaliatory cycles. Human rights law preserves religious and civic space. Parliamentary, judicial and international review constrain executive action. Nuclear safeguards replace worst-case assumption with inspectable evidence. None guarantees peace by itself, but together they create the institutional conditions in which peace is more than a pause between attacks.

Counterarguments and alternative perspectives

"Only decisive force can compel Iran to stop"

Proponents argue that negotiations have repeatedly failed and that hardened facilities, missiles and proxy networks allow Iran to exploit delay. Force may degrade an immediate capability, and self-defence remains available after an armed attack. The limitation is that tactical degradation is not the same as sustainable control. A lawful operation still requires necessity, proportionality and target-specific compliance. If force increases concealment, regional retaliation and domestic support for weaponisation, its long-term security effect may be negative.

"The Saudi deal strengthens non-proliferation by keeping the United States involved"

This is plausible. United States technology, contractors and safeguards could offer more leverage and transparency than an alternative supplier. The argument becomes persuasive only when the binding agreement contains durable restrictions, IAEA access, spent-fuel control, enforcement and transparency. Strategic trust in the supplier is not a safeguards system.

"Jewish prayer at the holiest site is an equality issue"

The equality claim cannot be dismissed. Freedom of religion protects individuals, including Jewish worshippers. But rights are exercised within a site of exceptional legal, historical and conflict sensitivity. Changes imposed through ministerial participation, unequal policing or restrictions on another community's access are not neutral equality measures. Any durable change requires inclusive negotiation, non-discrimination and credible security guarantees, not unilateral facts on the ground.

"The ICC overreaches against non-member States"

The jurisdictional objection is legally serious and should be litigated through the Rome Statute framework, domestic courts and diplomacy. It does not automatically justify penalising United States persons for research, communication or advocacy. The constitutional dispute concerns the means chosen to contest the ICC, not only the merits of the United States' jurisdictional position.

"Conflict reporting makes certainty impossible"

Complete certainty is often unavailable. That justifies careful attribution and qualified conclusions, not paralysis. Some findings are already strong: civilians were killed at Minab; the Department of Energy announced the Saudi agreements; the ICC sanctions order exists; large organised access to Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount occurred; and senior officials used escalatory language. What remains disputed should be investigated and labelled accordingly.

Risk assessment and plausible scenarios

Prioritised and actionable recommendations

Urgent: next 72 hours to 30 days

1. United States and Iran: establish a verified operational pause. Oman, the United Nations or another mutually acceptable intermediary should secure a time-bound halt to attacks on nuclear facilities, schools, hospitals, energy systems, ports and cross-border civilian infrastructure. The pause should include a military hotline and incident-notification protocol.
2. All conflict parties: publish target-protection directives. Commands should reissue binding instructions on distinction, proportionality, precautions, no-strike lists and protection of installations containing dangerous forces. Compliance cells should include senior legal advisers with authority to halt attacks.
3. United States: initiate an independent Minab investigation. Congress and the executive should ensure preservation of target folders, intelligence warnings, strike logs, weapon data and communications. A public interim report should state attribution, known casualties, investigative scope and expected completion date.
4. Iran and affected Gulf States: permit independent verification of July strikes. Access for credible investigators should be provided where consistent with immediate safety. Public claims should distinguish confirmed damage from preliminary military assessment.
5. Israel, Jordan and the Islamic Waqf: freeze unilateral change at Al-Aqsa/Temple Mount. Israeli authorities should prevent public officials from using access to assert exclusive ownership, ensure non-discriminatory Muslim worship access, and restore a joint incident-management mechanism with Jordan and the Waqf.

Near term: one to six months

1. IAEA and Iran: negotiate special verification access for Pickaxe Mountain. The objective should be to determine current use and material status without legitimising attack. Managed access, environmental sampling, remote monitoring or other safeguards tools should be considered according to the site's status and Iran's obligations.
2. United States Congress: require the full Saudi agreement before approval. Review should address enrichment, reprocessing, spent fuel, the Additional Protocol, IAEA primacy, contractor control, termination, breach, liability, physical protection, cyber security and emergency preparedness. Political normalisation should not weaken technical safeguards.
3. Saudi Arabia: bring the Additional Protocol into force before sensitive transfer. Riyadh should also commit to regional nuclear-accident notification, IAEA safety review, imported fuel and supplier take-back arrangements unless a later multilateral fuel-cycle regime is agreed.
4. United States courts: expedite constitutional review of ICC sanctions. The case should proceed with adequate adversarial testing. Pending review, the executive should issue clear licences protecting journalism, legal representation, evidence preservation, academic research, humanitarian communication and ordinary human rights advocacy.
5. United Nations: create a consolidated civilian-harm and dangerous-facilities mechanism. Reporting should cover schools, medical facilities, nuclear sites, energy systems and cross-border attacks, using transparent verification standards and equal treatment of all parties.

Structural: six months and beyond

1. Regional States: pursue a Middle East nuclear and radiological risk-reduction compact. Initial measures should include no-attack commitments for safeguarded nuclear facilities, emergency hotlines, radiation-data exchange, notification of major exercises and discussion of a regional fuel-bank model.
2. United States and regional partners: separate non-proliferation criteria from alliance status. A published safeguards benchmark should apply to all civil-nuclear partners and explain any difference in treatment through objective risk and compliance factors.
3. Israeli and Palestinian leadership, with Jordan: negotiate a rights-based holy-sites protocol. It should protect access, prohibit ministerial provocation and violence, define policing limits, establish independent complaints review and preserve each community's dignity without prejudging final-status claims.
4. Conflict parties: establish civilian reparation programmes. These should provide transparent claims procedures, forensic support, family participation, rehabilitation, education reconstruction and acknowledgement without conditioning assistance on waiver of legal rights.
5. States supporting international justice: protect evidence ecosystems. Secure archives, lawful information-sharing, defender protection and diversified funding are necessary so that sanctions, conflict or political pressure cannot erase documentation.

Final conclusion and overall determination

The immediate danger is a larger attack on Iran and a corresponding expansion of Iranian retaliation. The deeper danger is the normalisation of a regional order in which power determines which nuclear programme is tolerated, which civilian deaths are investigated, which community may define a sacred site and which court or organisation may pursue accountability.

No party possesses a monopoly on legitimate security concerns. United States personnel and regional shipping face real threats. Israelis face missile attack. Iranians face bombardment and mass civilian harm. Palestinians face occupation, restrictions and the danger of unilateral change at a central holy site. Gulf populations face consequences from military facilities and decisions they may not control. Recognition of these distinct harms is not false equivalence; it is the factual foundation for equal law.

Notes and references

1. United Nations, Charter of the United Nations; International Committee of the Red Cross, Additional Protocol I, Article 48; IAEA, The IAEA and the Non-Proliferation Treaty; OHCHR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights. ↩
2. The White House, Executive Order 14203, Imposing Sanctions on the International Criminal Court, 6 February 2025. ↩
3. United Nations Media, OHCHR statement on the Minab school strike, 27 March 2026; United Nations Security Council, Children Are Not Expendable, 24 June 2026. The latter record reports a figure of 168 killed, while other reporting has used different totals. ↩
4. DAWN and Taxpayer Alliance Against Genocide, Complaint, Case No. 1:26-cv-05957, filed 15 July 2026; DAWN, case announcement. ↩
5. United States Department of Energy, United States and Saudi Arabia Reach Historic Nuclear Cooperation Agreement, 22 July 2026. ↩
6. Tehran Times, Iran expands retaliatory campaign against satanic enemy, 22 July 2026; Tehran Times, Iran condemns Kuwait after US attacks launched from Kuwaiti soil, 22 July 2026. The descriptions are cited as Iranian claims, not independently adjudicated facts. ↩
7. Tehran Times, 34 mothers lay their children's remains to rest again, 22 July 2026. ↩
8. Axios, Trump close to decision on massive attack on Iran, 23 July 2026; The Times of Israel, Trump claims he is close to deciding on largest-ever attack against Iran, 23 July 2026. ↩
9. Al Jazeera, More than 4,200 Israelis storm Al-Aqsa Mosque in Jerusalem, 23 July 2026; The Times of Israel, Thousands of Jews visit Temple Mount for Tisha B'Av; some pray openly, 23 July 2026; The Times of Israel, At the Western Wall on Tisha B'Av, prayers for redemption mingle with hopes for peace, 23 July 2026. ↩
10. International Court of Justice, Legal Consequences arising from the Policies and Practices of Israel in the Occupied Palestinian Territory, including East Jerusalem, Advisory Opinion, 19 July 2024, and official summary. ↩
11. International Court of Justice, Legality of the Threat or Use of Nuclear Weapons, Advisory Opinion, 8 July 1996, especially the Court's treatment of the relationship between a threat and the legality of the contemplated force. ↩
12. United Nations Media, UN human rights statement calling for justice and a prompt, transparent investigation into the Minab strike, 27 March 2026. ↩
13. United Nations Security Council, S/PV.10155, 21 May 2026, recording calls to preserve and respect the status quo of Jerusalem's holy sites; see also United Nations, Implementation of Security Council resolution 2334, 25 June 2025. ↩
14. Reuters via Dawn, What is Pickaxe Mountain, the Iranian nuclear-linked site threatened by Trump?, 23 July 2026; Institute for Science and International Security, What to Know About Pickaxe Mountain, July 2026. ↩
15. IAEA, Director General's statement to the Security Council on the situation in Iran, 20 June 2025; IAEA, statement to the special session of the Board of Governors, 2 March 2026. ↩
16. IAEA, Treaty on the Non-Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons, INFCIRC/140, Article IV. ↩
17. Al Jazeera, What are the security implications of the US-Saudi nuclear deal?, 23 July 2026; Al Jazeera, Trump says Saudi nuclear pact hinges on kingdom joining Abraham Accords, 23 July 2026. ↩
18. IAEA, Status List: Conclusion of Safeguards Agreements, Additional Protocols and Small Quantities Protocols, status as of 30 June 2026. ↩
19. United Nations International Law Commission, Articles on Responsibility of States for Internationally Wrongful Acts, Article 16; see the official commentary. ↩
20. International Committee of the Red Cross, Additional Protocol I: Article 51, protection of the civilian population; Article 52, civilian objects; and Article 57, precautions in attack. The core principles discussed are also widely recognised in customary international humanitarian law. ↩
21. OHCHR, International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, Articles 2, 6 and 18. ↩
22. DAWN and TAAG, Complaint, paragraphs 100-105; CNN, "US nonprofits sue Trump administration over ICC sanctions that 'muzzle Palestine advocacy'," 15 July 2026, reviewed in the supplied source package. ↩